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| 5486 | Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language |
| 5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [PG] |
| 5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions |
| 5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent |
| 5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects |
| 5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional |
| 5443 | Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable |
| 5444 | 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to |
| 5462 | Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate |
| 5448 | 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way |
| 5477 | One thing can look like something else, without being the something else |
| 5479 | Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible |
| 5483 | Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world |
| 5447 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things |
| 5476 | Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori |
| 5478 | Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility |
| 5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals |
| 5453 | Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction |
| 5466 | Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass |
| 5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue |
| 5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour |
| 5457 | Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [PG] |
| 5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency |
| 5489 | Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions |
| 5490 | Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right |
| 5472 | Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures |
| 5471 | Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws |
| 5446 | For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical |
| 5480 | The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws |
| 5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents |
| 5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances |
| 5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved |
| 5442 | For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside |
| 5473 | The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds |
| 5474 | Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances |
| 5475 | We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws |
| 5460 | Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once |
| 5459 | Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws |
| 5461 | The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell |
| 5464 | For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds |
| 5487 | Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology |