Ideas from 'The Philosopher's Toolkit' by J Baggini / PS Fosl [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Philosopher's Toolkit' by Baggini,J and Fosl,P.S. [Blackwells 2003,0-631-22873-x]].

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason

4643	The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

4633	You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic

4635	Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL

4632	'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms

4631	In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence

4638	The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin'

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

4640	If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [PG]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity

4647	'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

4639	Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity

4646	Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori?

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori

4645	'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

4582	Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification

4644	A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction

4584	The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature

14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction

4583	How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction?

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation

4634	Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness

4637	To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality

4629	Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality