Ideas from 'Carnap and Logical Truth' by Willard Quine [1954], by Theme Structure
		
		[found in 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' by Quine,Willard  [Harvard 1976,0-674-94837-8]].
		
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		5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
		
	
	
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			13010 
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    	In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian]  
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					5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 9002 
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			Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables
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					5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 13681 
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			Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Sider]  
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					5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 13829 
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			If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking]  
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					5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 9003 
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			Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling
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					6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 9004 
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			If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic
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					8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 9006 
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			Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping
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					10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 9001 
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			Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?'
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					12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
	            
            	       
	
	
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						 9005 
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			Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge
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