Ideas from 'Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues' by Ernest Sosa [2003], by Theme Structure
		
		[found in 'Epistemic Justification' by Bonjour,L/Sosa,E  [Blackwells 2003,0-631-18284-5]].
		
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		2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
		
	
	
		| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit | 
		
		
		
		
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
		
		
		
		
	    
				
					6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge |