Ideas from 'Epistemic Norms' by John L. Pollock [1986], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Epistemology - An Anthology' (ed/tr Sosa,E. /Kim,J.) [Blackwell 2000,0-631-19724-9]].
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
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Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
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Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
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What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something?
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
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Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
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Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
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Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
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If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
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Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external
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Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
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Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use
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