Ideas from 'Causal Explanation' by David Lewis [1986], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Philosophical Papers Vol.2' by Lewis,David [OUP 1986,0-19-503646-8]].
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
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15557
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Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
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15554
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A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property?
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
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15560
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We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
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Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
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Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
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A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
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To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history
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Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Psillos]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
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Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
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We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry.
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Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right'
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
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Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events
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