Ideas from 'The Semantic Conception of Truth' by Alfred Tarski [1944], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language' (ed/tr Linsky,Leonard) [University of Illinois 1972,0-252-00093-5]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
19199
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Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
19193
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Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
19179
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For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19177
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A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct
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19178
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Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one
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19186
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A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language
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19194
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We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
19196
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Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth
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19180
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It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified
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19181
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In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white
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19183
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Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction
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19182
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Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate'
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19198
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We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19184
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The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects)
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19191
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Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19188
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We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed
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19189
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The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10824
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If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19190
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We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
19197
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Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19185
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Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems
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4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
19195
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Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
19192
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The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws)
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
19187
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The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously
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