Ideas from 'The Semantic Conception of Truth' by Alfred Tarski [1944], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language' (ed/tr Linsky,Leonard) [University of Illinois 1972,0-252-00093-5]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science

19199

Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis

19193

Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

19179

For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth

19178

Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one

19177

A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct

19186

A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language

19194

We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition

19196

Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth

19180

It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified

19181

In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white

19182

Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate'

19183

Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction

19198

We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth

19184

The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects)

19191

Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth

19188

We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed

19189

The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth

10824

If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H]

3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth

19190

We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth

19197

Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth

19185

Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables

19195

Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle

19192

The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws)

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

19187

The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously