Ideas from 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)' by J Pollock / J Cruz [1999], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' by Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J [Rowman and Littlefield 1999,0-8476-8937-9]].
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
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The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
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Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively
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To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
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Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
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Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
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Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
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Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
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Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable)
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
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Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
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Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
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Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
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Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
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Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
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Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge
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Coherence theories isolate justification from the world
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
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Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
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One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
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We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start
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14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
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Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion
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14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
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Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies?
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
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Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation
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