Ideas from 'Reference and Necessity' by Robert C. Stalnaker [1997], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Ways a World Might Be' by Stalnaker,Robert C. [OUP 2003,0-19-925149-5]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

---

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

16405

To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum

16407

Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

16397

If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways

16399

Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains

16398

Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

16396

Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation

16408

Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning

16406

If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

16404

In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics

16403

'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics

16401

To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true