Ideas from 'Logical Properties' by Colin McGinn [2000], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Logical Properties' by McGinn,Colin [OUP 2003,0-19-926263-2]].
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
6052
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Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity
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2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
6064
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Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
6088
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Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
6084
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'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall
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6085
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The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
6083
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The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
6086
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Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts
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6087
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Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
6051
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In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements
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6055
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Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation
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6059
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Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
6042
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The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool
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6067
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Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists'
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
6069
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'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
6068
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We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
6070
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Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
6062
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Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence
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6065
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We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
6082
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If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
6075
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Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
6058
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Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
6053
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Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
6043
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Type-identity is close similarity in qualities
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6045
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It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance'
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6044
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Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties
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6046
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Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
6054
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Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
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6066
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Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
6047
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All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
6048
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Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity
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6049
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Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'
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6050
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Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
6080
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Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
6079
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If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
6081
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Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6071
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Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
6077
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Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
6074
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Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning?
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28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
6072
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If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence
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6073
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I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined
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