Ideas from 'Objects and Persons' by Trenton Merricks [2003], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Objects and Persons' by Merricks,Trenton [OUP 2003,0-19-926631-x]].
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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6123
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Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
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Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
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A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
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Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
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I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist
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6134
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Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts?
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
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We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
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Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Liggins]
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6142
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The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways
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If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Thomasson]
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Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing)
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing
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6131
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Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things
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6132
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Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts
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6141
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There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
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'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object
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6138
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It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
6128
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Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
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Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
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The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
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You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
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Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
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Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
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Human organisms can exercise downward causation
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
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Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties
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6147
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The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties
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