Ideas from 'Thinking about Consciousness' by David Papineau [2002], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Thinking about Consciousness' by Papineau,David [OUP 2004,0-19-927115-1]].
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7871
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Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
7852
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The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
7864
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Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason)
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
7873
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Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs
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7874
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Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory?
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
7882
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Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
7854
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Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague
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7889
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Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation
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7891
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We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
7890
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Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
7885
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The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
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7886
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Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
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7887
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States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
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7888
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Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
7860
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The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else
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7862
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Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
7870
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Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
7858
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If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
7865
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Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7892
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The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7879
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Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles
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20971
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Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
7856
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It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
7881
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Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
7866
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Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
7850
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Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it
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7851
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Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
7884
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Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content
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7863
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If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions?
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
7883
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Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
7872
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Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
7868
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Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true
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7869
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Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
7853
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Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs
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7857
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Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
20976
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The completeness of physics cannot be proved
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20974
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Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces
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20970
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Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role
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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
20975
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Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy
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