Ideas from 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' by Kit Fine [1975], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Vagueness: a Reader' (ed/tr Keefe,R /Smith,P) [MIT 1999,0-262-61145-7]].
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
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Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
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Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
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Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
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Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
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A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
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A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise
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Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values
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Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision)
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With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work
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Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
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Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers
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