Ideas from 'Material Beings' by Peter van Inwagen [1990], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Material Beings' by Inwagen,Peter van [Cornell 1995,0-8014-8306-9]].
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
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14227
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We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise'
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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
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10662
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Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Varzi]
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
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17587
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The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
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17558
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Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
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17578
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I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
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17582
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Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
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17556
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Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff
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8264
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Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Lowe]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
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17565
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Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible
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14228
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If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins]
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14468
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Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
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17571
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Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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17562
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The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump
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17574
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If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
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17531
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I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples'
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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17560
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If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object?
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17561
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If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
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17566
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I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship
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14230
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We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Liggins]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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17557
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Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something?
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
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17564
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The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
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17575
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The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
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17577
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When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron?
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
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17589
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If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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17588
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We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity'
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
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17572
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Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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17579
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Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
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17590
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A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion
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17591
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Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities
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27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
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17563
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The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together
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27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
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17559
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Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required?
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27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
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17569
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Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap
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17576
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If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me
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17580
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One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body
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17581
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Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague
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17584
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Some events are only borderline cases of lives
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17585
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Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague?
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17586
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At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction
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17568
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A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism
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17567
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A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated
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17570
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The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements
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28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
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17573
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There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing
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