Ideas from 'Knowledge by Agreement' by Martin Kusch [2002], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Knowledge by Agreement' by Kusch,Martin [OUP 2004,0-19-925137-1]].
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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10354
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Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
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10353
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Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
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10337
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We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
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10357
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Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
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10339
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Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
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10331
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Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs
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10338
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The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
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10340
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Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment
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10345
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Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
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10350
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Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
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10343
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Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
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10341
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Justification depends on the audience and one's social role
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
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10325
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Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism
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10336
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Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives
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10334
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Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics
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10324
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Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge
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10327
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Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences
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10329
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Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories
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10330
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A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
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10335
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Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism
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10323
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Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people
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10348
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Private justification is justification to imagined other people
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
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10349
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To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
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10344
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Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?
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19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
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10358
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Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them
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24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
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10333
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Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
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10351
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Natural kinds are social institutions
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28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
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10332
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Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept
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