Ideas from 'Reference and Contingency' by Gareth Evans [1979], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Collected Papers' by Evans,Gareth [OUP 1985,0-19-823627-1]].
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
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'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification
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Full Idea:
Evans says intuitively a sentence is 'superficially' contingent if the function from worlds to truth values assigns F to some world; it is 'deeply' contingent if understanding it does not guarantee that there is a verifying state of affairs.
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From:
report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 2
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A reaction:
This distinction is used by Davies and Humberstone (1980) to construct an early version of 2-D semantics (see under Language|Semantics). The point is that part comes from understanding it, and another part from assigning truth values.
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
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Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty
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Full Idea:
Evans argues that there can be rigid designators that are meaningful even if empty.
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From:
report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.8
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