Ideas from 'From an Ontological Point of View' by John Heil [2003], by Theme Structure
[found in 'From an Ontological Point of View' by Heil,John [OUP 2005,0-19-928698-1]].
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
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7001
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If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
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7037
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Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be
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7038
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A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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7004
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The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
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7035
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God does not create the world, and then add the classes
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
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7017
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The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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7003
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There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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7045
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Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints'
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
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7065
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Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
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7020
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Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
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7007
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I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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7015
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A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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7042
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A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
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7023
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Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
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7025
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Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added?
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
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7034
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Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
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7039
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How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances?
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
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7009
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Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for
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7041
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Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
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7032
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Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
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7008
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Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes
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7018
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Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
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7019
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Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
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7046
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Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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7047
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Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical
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7048
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Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze?
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
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7028
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If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable
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7029
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Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property?
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7030
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Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
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7051
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Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
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7044
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Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us
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7052
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Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
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7053
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Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
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7066
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If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs?
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
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7021
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If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
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7026
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Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
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7060
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One form of explanation is by decomposition
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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7010
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Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality
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7054
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Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
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7011
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Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
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7061
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Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world
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7063
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Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical
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7064
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Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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7027
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Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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7062
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Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
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7059
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The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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7012
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If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything?
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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7043
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Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
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7058
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Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
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7057
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Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
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7013
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The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
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7002
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If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
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7016
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The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events
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27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
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7036
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The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties
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