Ideas from 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory'' by David M. Armstrong [1992], by Theme Structure
[found in 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' by Armstrong,D.M. [Routledge 1993,0-415-10031-3]].
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
7440
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Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
7437
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Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
7434
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Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7436
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The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7429
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Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
7438
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A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7431
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The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7432
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One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types
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