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Ideas from 'The Intentionality of Sensation' by G.E.M. Anscombe [1965], by Theme Structure

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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7439 The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional
                        Full Idea: Anscombe argued that the qualities involved in sensations are one and all intentional only (and I think this holds even for the bodily sensations).
                        From: report of G.E.M. Anscombe (The Intentionality of Sensation [1965]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xxii
                        A reaction: Compare Harry Gildersleve's exactly opposite proposal in Idea 7272. I think I am coming round to the Anscombe view, which builds the more mysterious up from the less mysterious. Gildersleve must explain how atomic qualia arise.