Ideas from 'Thought and Reality' by Michael Dummett [1997], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' by Dummett,Michael [OUP 2006,0-19-920727-5]].
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
8166
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Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
8173
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Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
8179
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The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
8184
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Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
8185
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We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
8163
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Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
8161
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We know we can state facts, with true statements
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
8180
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'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8178
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Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
8175
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A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions
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8174
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The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
8165
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To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
8168
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To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
8181
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A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic
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8182
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Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power
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8183
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If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
8176
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We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
8170
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Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
8169
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We can't distinguish a proposition from its content
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
8186
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Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
8167
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If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes
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