Ideas from 'Nature's Metaphysics' by Alexander Bird [2007], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Nature's Metaphysics' by Bird,Alexander [OUP 2007,978-0-19-922701-3]].
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
9449
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The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
9501
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If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
9500
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If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
9502
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There might be just one fundamental natural property
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9477
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Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds
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9490
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The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself
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9495
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If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it
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9492
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Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
9503
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To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14540
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Only real powers are fundamental [Mumford/Anjum]
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
9450
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If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress
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9498
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The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
9474
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A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out
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9475
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A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
9499
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Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
9486
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Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular?
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
9472
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Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9482
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If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
9481
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Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
9505
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Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
9491
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Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
9487
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We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
9493
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We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
9494
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Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
9507
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Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
9488
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Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
9496
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That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is
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9479
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Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
9473
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Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals
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9484
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If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
9506
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Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
23713
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Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
9489
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Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
9504
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The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be
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