Ideas from 'Causation and Supervenience' by Michael Tooley [2003], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics' (ed/tr Loux,M /Zimmerman,D) [OUP 2005,0-19-928422-9]].
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8388
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Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism
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8389
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Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8393
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We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8390
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Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8392
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Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening
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8399
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The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8391
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In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8394
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Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation
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8398
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Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process
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