Ideas from 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' by William Lycan [1979], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Possible and the Actual' (ed/tr Loux,Michael J.) [Cornell 1979,0-8014-9178-9]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
expand these ideas
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15787
|
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle
|
15784
|
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist
|
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792
|
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795
|
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events
|
15796
|
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794
|
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility
|