Ideas from 'A Study of Concepts' by Christopher Peacocke [1992], by Theme Structure
[found in 'A Study of Concepts' by Peacocke,Christopher [MIT 1999,0-262-66097-0]].
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
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Most people can't even define a chair
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
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Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
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Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
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Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
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Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Machery]
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Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Machery]
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Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
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Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it
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A concept is just what it is to possess that concept
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Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
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An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
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Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Greco]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
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A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Horwich]
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