Ideas from 'Semantic Relationism' by Kit Fine [2007], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Semantic Relationism' by Fine,Kit [OUP 2007,978-1-4051-0843-0]].
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
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15592
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The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values
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15593
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Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals
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15590
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It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that
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15591
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In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't
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15595
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The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts
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15594
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'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
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15599
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Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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15603
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I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
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15604
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If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well?
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
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15602
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Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
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15588
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You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
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15596
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The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression
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15587
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That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships
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15589
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The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic)
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15598
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We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!)
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15600
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Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives
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15601
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Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
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15605
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I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration
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