Ideas from 'On Formally Undecidable Propositions' by Kurt Gödel [1931], by Theme Structure
		
		[found in 'From Frege to Gödel 1879-1931' (ed/tr Heijenoort,Jean van)  [Harvard 1967,0-674-32449-8]].
		
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		3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
		
	
	
		| 21752 | Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Quine] | 
		
		
		
		
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
		
		
		
		
	    
				
					4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 17835 | Gödel show that the incompleteness of set theory was a necessity [Hallett,M] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 17886 | The limitations of axiomatisation were revealed by the incompleteness theorems [Koellner] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 10071 | Second Incompleteness: nice theories can't prove their own consistency [Smith,P] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19123 | If soundness can't be proved internally, 'reflection principles' can be added to assert soundness [Halbach/Leigh] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 10621 | Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicism, and the Second sabotages Hilbert's Programme [Smith,P] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 17888 | The undecidable sentence can be decided at a 'higher' level in the system | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 10132 | There can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived [George/Velleman] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 10072 | First Incompleteness: arithmetic must always be incomplete [Smith,P] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 9590 | Arithmetical truth cannot be fully and formally derived from axioms and inference rules [Nagel/Newman] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 11069 | Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability [Hanna] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 10118 | First Incompleteness: a decent consistent system is syntactically incomplete [George/Velleman] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 10122 | Second Incompleteness: a decent consistent system can't prove its own consistency [George/Velleman] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 3198 | Gödel showed that arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent [Rey] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 10611 | There is a sentence which a theory can show is true iff it is unprovable [Smith,P] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 10867 | 'This system can't prove this statement' makes it unprovable either way [Clegg] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 8747 | Realists are happy with impredicative definitions, which describe entities in terms of other existing entities [Shapiro] | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 3192 | Basic logic can be done by syntax, with no semantics [Rey] |