Ideas from 'The Metaphysics of Properties' by Alex Oliver [1996], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Mind' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
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10468
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A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them)
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
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10471
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Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
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10749
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Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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10750
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Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
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10747
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Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them
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10748
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Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
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10721
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If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete?
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10719
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There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
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10716
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There are just as many properties as the laws require
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
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10720
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We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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10714
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The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms
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10715
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There are five main semantic theories for properties
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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10739
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The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness
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10738
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Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice
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10740
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The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes
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10741
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Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
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10742
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Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
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10472
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'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
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10730
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If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals?
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10724
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Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place
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7963
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Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
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7962
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Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy
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10727
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Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
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10722
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Instantiation is set-membership
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
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10744
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Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
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10726
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Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing
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10725
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Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
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10745
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Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
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10746
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Conceptual priority is barely intelligible
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