Ideas from 'Truth-makers' by Mulligan/Simons/Smith [1984], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Truth and Truth-Making' (ed/tr Lowe,E.J./Rami,A.) [Acumen 2009,978-1-84465-145-0]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
unexpand these ideas
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10911
|
Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers
|
|
|
|
Full Idea:
The most important (ontological) relations holding among truth-makers are the part and whole relations.
|
|
|
|
From:
Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6)
|
|
|
|
A reaction:
Hence Peter Simons goes off and writes the best known book on mereology. Looks very promising to me.
|
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10909
|
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true
|
|
|
|
Full Idea:
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true, because sentences with more than one truth-maker would then be ambiguous, and 'a' and 'a exists' would have the same designatum.
|
|
|
|
From:
Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3)
|
10906
|
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers
|
|
|
|
Full Idea:
A 'moment' is an existentially dependent or non-self-sufficient object, that is, an object which is of such a nature that it cannot exist alone, ....... and we suggest that moments could serve as truth-makers.
|
|
|
|
From:
Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §2)
|
|
|
|
A reaction:
[These three writers invented the term 'truth-maker']
|
10907
|
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items
|
|
|
|
Full Idea:
A proposition may have a minimal truth-maker which is not unique, or a sentence may be made true by no single truth-maker but only by several jointly, or again only by several separately.
|
|
|
|
From:
Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3)
|
10912
|
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences
|
|
|
|
Full Idea:
Because of negative propositions, investigators of truth-makers have said that they are special non-objectual entities with a logical complexity, but we think a theory is possible in which the truth relation is tied to ordinary and scientific experience.
|
|
|
|
From:
Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6)
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
10908
|
Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers
|
|
|
|
Full Idea:
The correspondence theory of truth invokes a special category of non-objectual entities - facts, states of affairs, or whatever - simply to serve as truth-makers.
|
|
|
|
From:
Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3)
|