Ideas from 'The Metaphysics of Properties' by Alex Oliver [1996], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mind' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them)
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them
Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete?
There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
There are just as many properties as the laws require
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms
There are five main semantic theories for properties
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness
Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice
Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars
The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place
If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals?
Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy
Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Instantiation is set-membership
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing
Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Structure of Concepts / h. Conceptual priority
Conceptual priority is barely intelligible