Ideas from 'World and Essence' by Alvin Plantinga [1970], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' by Plantinga,Alvin [OUP 2003,0-19-510377-7]].

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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / a. Individuation
The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not P elsewhere)
Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world
If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property?
Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies