Ideas from 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?' by Alvin Plantinga [1973], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Possible and the Actual' (ed/tr Loux,Michael J.) [Cornell 1979,0-8014-9178-9]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently