Ideas from 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?' by Alvin Plantinga [1973], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Possible and the Actual' (ed/tr Loux,Michael J.) [Cornell 1979,0-8014-9178-9]].

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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently