Ideas from 'Actualism and Possible Worlds' by Alvin Plantinga [1976], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' by Plantinga,Alvin [OUP 2003,0-19-510377-7]].

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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one