Ideas from 'De Anima' by Aristotle [329 BCE], by Theme Structure
[found in 'De Anima (On the Soul)' by Aristotle (ed/tr Lawson-Tancred,H.C.) [Penguin 1986,0-14-044471-8]].
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
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24047
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An account is either a definition or a demonstration
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
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24052
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From one thing alone we can infer its contrary
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
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1729
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We perceive number by the denial of continuity
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
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24057
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What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
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16752
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Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
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24058
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The substance is the cause of a thing's being
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
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24040
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Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account
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24055
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Matter is potential, form is actual
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
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5051
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The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
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1730
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Why do we have many senses, and not just one?
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1725
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Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli?
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1724
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Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite
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17711
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Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Mares]
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1732
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Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing
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16723
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Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
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1728
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Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
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1727
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Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
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1734
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In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided
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12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
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1726
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We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
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24048
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Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions
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16647
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Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
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16646
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To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
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1714
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Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
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5507
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Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Martin/Barresi]
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24051
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Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements
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12086
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Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life
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16754
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The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
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24046
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Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts
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1717
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If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity
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24053
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If a soul have parts, what unites them?
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1721
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What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
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1735
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In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
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24061
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If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
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24062
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Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
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1710
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Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
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24056
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The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body
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24039
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All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
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24050
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If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies?
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24049
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Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached
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1514
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Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
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2683
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Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill]
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1718
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Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things?
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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13275
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The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
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1733
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Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
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23307
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Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Sorabji]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
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24060
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Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
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4376
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Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
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1740
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Nature does nothing in vain
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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
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1739
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If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts
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24045
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Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth
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1738
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Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement
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24044
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Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors)
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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
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24064
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If something is pushed, it pushes back
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27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
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24063
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What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away
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