Ideas from 'On Interpretation' by Aristotle [330 BCE], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Categories and De Interpretatione' by Aristotle (ed/tr Ackrill,J.R.) [OUP 1963,0-19-872086-6]].

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries

1708	In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries?

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths

1703	It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth

1704	Statements are true according to how things actually are

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic

22272

Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter]

9405	Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic

9728	Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Fitting/Mendelsohn]

9729	Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Fitting/Mendelsohn]

9730	Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Fitting/Mendelsohn]

9731	Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Fitting/Mendelsohn]

9732	Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Fitting/Mendelsohn]

9733	Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Fitting/Mendelsohn]

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence

21593

In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Williamson]

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle

1701	A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

1706	Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence

1707	Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental

2337	For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Putnam]

19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions

13763

Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all

19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial

1705	It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block

1702	Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary