Ideas from 'Eudemian Ethics' by Aristotle [333 BCE], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Eudemian Ethics I,II and VIII' by Aristotle (ed/tr Woods,Michael) [OUP 1992,0-19-824020-1]].

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young
Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Only a human being can be a starting point for an action
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Some emotional states are too strong for human nature
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point
The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind
We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Frede,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more)
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is different from continence
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos)
Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part
Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them
We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing
Decent people can be friends with base people
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The main function of politics is to produce friendship
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
It is folly not to order one's life around some end
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Each thing's function is its end