Ideas from 'Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study'' by B Hale / C Wright [2001], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Reason's Proper Study' by Hale,B/Wright,C [OUP 2003,978-0-19-926632-6]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Objects just are what singular terms refer to
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 6. Abstract Concepts / g. Abstracta by equivalence
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities
19. Language / F. Analytic/Synthetic / 3. Analytic Truths
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions