Ideas from 'Potentiality' by Barbara Vetter [2015], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' by Vetter,Barbara [OUP 2015,978-0-19-871431-6]].

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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
 19023 Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
 19033 Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
 19032 S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
 19036 The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
 19034 The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
 19015 Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
 19012 The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
 19024 A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
 19021 I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
 19016 We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
 19017 Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
 19014 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
 19030 Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
 19040 We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
 19008 The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
 19029 It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
 19010 All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
 19013 Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
 19028 Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
 19031 There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
 19027 Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
 19019 Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
 19022 Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
 19009 Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
 19025 Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
 19011 If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
 19037 Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
 19018 Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
 19020 Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
 19039 The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
 19038 Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ
27. Natural Reality / A. Space-Time / 2. Time / f. Presentism
 19041 Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions
27. Natural Reality / A. Space-Time / 2. Time / g. Eternalism
 19026 If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?