Ideas from 'Potentiality' by Barbara Vetter [2015], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' by Vetter,Barbara [OUP 2015,978-0-19-871431-6]].

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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / f. Presentism
Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / g. Eternalism
If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ