Ideas from 'Potentiality' by Barbara Vetter [2015], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' by Vetter,Barbara [OUP 2015,978-0-19-871431-6]].

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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / f. Presentism
Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / g. Eternalism
If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ