Ideas from 'My Philosophical Development' by Bertrand Russell [1959], by Theme Structure

[found in 'My Philosophical Development' by Russell,Bertrand [Routledge 1993,0-415-09865-3]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Analysis
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism
Complex things can be known, but not simple things
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Error
Surprise is a criterion of error
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience'
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images
19. Language / B. Meaning / 3. Meaning as Verification
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false
19. Language / E. Propositions / 4. Support for Propositions
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words