Ideas from 'The Inessential Indexical' by Cappelen,H/Dever,J [2013], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Inessential Indexical' by Cappelen,H/Dever,J [OUP 2013,978-0-19-968674-2]].

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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Self-Knowledge
Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent
Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality
We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception
Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency
If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it
All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use
You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint
Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world
19. Language / C. Semantics / 2. Fregean Semantics
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are
19. Language / C. Semantics / 5. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained
19. Language / C. Semantics / 6. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts
Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense
All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically
19. Language / H. Pragmatics / 5. Contextual Meaning
It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive
The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character
20. Action / B. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs