Ideas from 'Epistemology' by Cardinal/Hayward/Jones [2004], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Epistemology: the theory of knowledge' by Cardinal/Hayward/Jones [John Murray 2004,0-7195-7967-8]].

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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable
Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects
If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities
An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world