Ideas from 'Pragmatism and Deflationism' by Cheryl Misak [2007], by Theme Structure

[found in 'New Pramatists' (ed/tr Misak,Cheryl) [OUP 2009,978-0-19-927998-2]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries
Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling
Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards
For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible
'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence...
'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory
Disquotation is bivalent
Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'?
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories
Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry