Ideas from 'Pragmatism and Deflationism' by Cheryl Misak [2007], by Theme Structure

[found in 'New Pramatists' (ed/tr Misak,Cheryl) [OUP 2009,978-0-19-927998-2]].

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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling
For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible
'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence...
'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries
Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory
Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'?
Disquotation is bivalent
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories
Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry