Ideas from 'Properties' by Chris Swoyer [2000], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].

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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal
Can properties have parts?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples
19. Language / A. Language / 6. Predicates
The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations
19. Language / E. Propositions / 2. Nature of Propositions
Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers