Ideas from 'Logical Properties' by Colin McGinn [2000], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Logical Properties' by McGinn,Colin [OUP 2003,0-19-926263-2]].

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2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall
The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony
Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements
Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation
Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool
Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists'
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 7. Criterion for Existence
Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence
We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Reality
If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / b. Types of fact
Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties
Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved
It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance'
Type-identity is close similarity in qualities
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning?
28. God / C. Proofs of Reason / 2. Ontological Proof critique
If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence
I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined