Ideas from 'Consciousness Explained' by Daniel Dennett [1991], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Consciousness Explained' by Dennett,Daniel [Penguin 1993,0-14-012867]].

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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences'
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Brains are essentially anticipation machines
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious
Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special
Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information
16. Persons / B. Concept of the Self / 1. Essential Self
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but self must be All or Nothing
16. Persons / B. Concept of the Self / 6. Denial of the Self
The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits
The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain
We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them
We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are
Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 3. Eliminativism
Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
26. Natural Theory / A. Heart of Nature / 2. Natural Purpose
Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes