Ideas from 'The Conscious Mind' by David J.Chalmers [1996], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Conscious Mind' by Chalmers,David J. [OUP 1997,0-19-510553-2]].

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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set
Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Reduction requires logical supervenience
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
'Perception' means either an action or a mental state
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by reduction
Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Can we be aware but not conscious?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Can we explain behaviour without consciousness?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Hard Problem: why brains experience things
What turns awareness into consciousness?
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality just causal connections?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement?
Sometimes we don't notice our pains
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
It seems possible to invert qualia
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level?
Supervenience makes interaction laws possible
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
It is odd if experience is a very recent development
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation?
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it
19. Language / C. Semantics / 7. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O")
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds
19. Language / E. Propositions / 3. Types of Proposition
Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement
19. Language / F. Analytic/Synthetic / 3. Analytic Truths
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible