Ideas from 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' by David Lewis [1994], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind' (ed/tr Guttenplan,Samuel) [Blackwell 1995,0-631-19996-9]].

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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs.
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things