Ideas from 'Causation' by David Lewis [1973], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Causation' (ed/tr Sosa,E. /Tooley,M.) [OUP 1993,0-19-875094-3]].

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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Free Will Theories / b. Determinism
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation / e. Direction of causation
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption)
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter