Ideas from 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility' by David Lewis [1992], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' by Lewis,David [CUP 1999,0-521-58787-5]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Analysis
Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Predications aren't truth because of what exists, but of how it exists
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. States of Affairs
How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine